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United States v. Hayashi:i Taking Aim at
the Marine Mammal Protection Act
MARC A. YAGGI*
Although man's record as a steward of the natural re-
sources of the Earth has been a discouraging one, there has
long been a certain comfort in the belief that the sea, at
least, was inviolate, beyond man's ability to change and to
despoil. But this belief, unfortunately, has proved to be
naive.2
I. Introduction
For centuries, man has harvested fish from the world's
oceans, for both business and pleasure, with relentless fervor
and a blatant disregard for the incidental killing of marine
mammals. Each year, thousands of harp seals drown in cod
nets and an estimated 12,000 or more endangered and
threatened sea turtles die in shrimp nets.3 Additionally, nu-
merous dolphins are slaughtered by purse-seine fishing,4 a
* B.S., 1993, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. expected 1997,
Pace University School of Law. The author wishes to dedicate this Article to his
mother, father, and brother for instilling in him a respect for all things in
Nature. Also, the author gives special thanks to Patricia M. Carroll and her
group for their editing efforts.
1. United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994).
2. RACHEL CARSON, THE SEA AROUND Us 16 (spec. ed. 1989).
3. See G. TYLER MILLER, JR., LIVWnG IN THE E NmomTr 379 (8th ed.
1994).
4. Purse-seine fishing is a method of catching a large number of fish that
feed near the surface of the ocean by surrounding them with a net and pulling
the bottom closed. See id. Dolphins and yellowfin tuna commonly swim to-
gether; therefore, fishing vessels often set purse-seine nets on dolphins to catch
tuna. Such actions often result in the death of some or all of the dolphins
trapped in the nets. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964, 967
(N.D. Cal. 1990).
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method of catching tuna.5 In order to reduce the number of
marine mammals slaughtered, Congress passed the Marine
Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA).6 The MMPA was
designed to reduce the number of dolphins killed by commer-
cial tuna fishermen from approximately 400,000 per year to
20,500 per year.7 In addition to establishing restraints on
commercial fishermen, it was deemed unlawful for any non-
commercial or non-permitted commercial fisherman to
"take"s any marine mammal. 9 Although the statute prohibits
the "taking" of any marine mammal, fishermen still continue
to be a menace to marine mammals.
One case in which a non-commercial fisherman was
charged with violating the "takings" provision of the MMPA 10
was United States v. Hayashi.". David Hayashi fired two rifle
shots into the water in an attempt to dissuade four porpoises
from interfering with his tuna catch.' 2 Hayashi was tried on
stipulated facts and convicted, before a Magistrate Judge, for
"taking" a marine mammal.' 3 On appeal, the District Court
of Hawaii affirmed the conviction by written order.14
Hayashi then appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit, on the grounds that the MMPA and its
implementing regulations were unconstitutional due to
vagueness 15 and that the evidence on which the conviction
5. See MIu.LER, supra note 3, at 379.
6. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988)
[hereinafter MMPA].
7. See MaLLER, supra note 3, at 379.
8. The IVMIPA defines "take" as "to harass, hunt, capture, kill, or attempt
to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mammaL" MMPA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1362(12).
9. See id. § 1372(a).
10. See id. § 1372.
11. 22 F.3d 859.
12. See id. at 861.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. Hayashi argued that there was a "lack of direction and clarity in the
[MMPA] as it relates to 'harassing' conduct .... " See Reply Brief for the De-
fendant-Appellant at 2, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994)
(No. 92-10044) [hereinafter Appellant's Reply Brief].
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
UNITED STATES V. HAYASHI
was based was insufficient.' 6 The court of appeals reversed
Hayashi's conviction, holding that there was insufficient evi-
dence to support the defendant's conviction because the
MMPA and its implementing regulations do not make it a
crime to reasonably deter porpoises from eating part of a fish-
erman's catch. 17
This Article analyzes the Hayashi decision and the 1994
Amendments to the MMPA18 which stem directly from the
Hayashi decision,' 9 allowing general deterrence measures to
be used on marine mammals to protect fishing gear, catch,
property, and persons.20 Thus far, only proposed regulations
have been set forth. The proposed regulations undermine the
policies and goals of the MMPA and appear to have been
drafted in unjustifiable haste because (1) they fail to provide
sufficient guidance to fishermen and (2) they suggest the use
of potentially harmful deterrent measures which either could
injure or kill marine mammals, or drive them out of their nat-
ural habitat.21
Part II of this Article discusses the MMPA's legislative
history, goals, policies, and "takings" provision. Additionally,
Part II notes previous administrative proceedings that inter-
pret the "takings" provision of the MMPA, and it addresses
the 1994 Amendments to the MMPA that allow for the use of
general deterrence measures on marine mammals. Part III
16. See id. "Moreover, the record is devoid of any evidence that, whatever
Hayashi's intent, his actions had any results." Id.
17. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 860.
18. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
238, 108 Stat. 532 (1994) [hereinafter MMPA Amendments of 1994]. This Act
enacts 16 U.S.C §§ 1386 to 1389 and provisions set out as notes under 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1361, 1362, 1374, 1538 and 1539, amends 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361, 1362, 1371,
1372, 1374, 1375, 1379, 1380, 1382 to 1384, 1407, 1421 to 1421h and 4107, and
repeals 16 U.S.C. §§ 1384 and 1407.
19. See George A. Chmael H et al., The 1994 Amendments to the Marine
Mammal Protection Act, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 18, 20 (Spring 1995). The
MMPA was amended shortly after the Ninth Circuit entered its decision. Let-
ter from Katherine Hazard, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Environment & Natural Re-
sources Division (Oct. 12, 1995) (on file with author).
20. See Chmael, supra note 19, at 18.
21. For a discussion about marine mammal habitats and feeding habits, see
Dwight F. Davis, About Marine Mammals (last modified Aug. 14, 1995) <http'J/
www.marinelab.sarasota.fl.s/WMARINE.HTM>.
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of this Article discusses the facts, procedural history, major-
ity opinion, and dissenting opinion of United States v.
Hayashi,22 and then Part IV analyzes the Hayashi decision.
Part V of this Article discusses and analyzes the proposed
rules for implementing the general deterrence Amendments
to the MMPA. Finally, Part VI of this Article concludes by
demonstrating how the flawed reasoning of the Hayashi deci-
sion led to a hasty congressional amendment that will effec-
tively undermine the goals of the MMPA.
II. Background
A. Marine Mammal Protection Act2 3
The Marine Mammal Protection Act was enacted, in
1972, to protect and restore marine mammal populations.24
Three distinct interests led to the enactment of the MMPA:
(1) a commercial interest that recognized marine mammals
as an important resource that could be utilized indefinitely
under proper management; (2) a scientific interest that be-
lieved marine mammals play an important role in the marine
ecosystem; and (3) a civic interest that encompassed diverse
concerns such as a high regard for animal intelligence, 25
widespread fondness for the mammals,26 and outrage over
the depleted populations of marine mammals. 27 All three of
these groups felt that marine mammals should be left undis-
turbed.2 1 The legislative background of the MMPA expresses
Congress' deep concern for the mistreatment of marine mam-
22. 22 F.3d 859.
23. MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
24. See Chmael, supra note 19, at 18.
25. See Elise Miller, Comment, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse: Conflict-
ing Duties Under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1063 (1991). The cerebral cortex of marine mammals is similar to that of
humans. See id.
26. See Nancy Kubasek et al., Comment, Protecting Marine Mammals:
Time for a New Approach, 13 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1 (1994-95).
27. See id.
28. See MICHAEL J. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF WILDLIFE LAw 281, 282 (rev.
ed. 1977). "The Committee was impressed by the wide support for the principle
of broader and more adequate protection for marine mammals, expressed by
representatives of conservation and environmental organizations, humane
groups, independent scientists, state agencies and agencies of the Federal Gov-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
UNITED STATES V. HAYASHI
mals and for the increased protection of these mammals in
the future.29
Congress set forth broad goals for the MMPA. "[I]t is the
sense of the Congress that [marine mammals] should be pro-
tected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasi-
ble commensurate with sound policies of resource
management and that the primary objective of their manage-
ment should be to maintain the health and stability of the
marine ecosystem."30 To achieve these goals, Congress em-
powered the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of the
Interior to promulgate regulations for the MMPA.31 The Sec-
eminent and others." H.R. REP. No. 92-707 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4145.
29. See H.R. RP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N. 4144.
Recent history indicates that man's impact upon marine mammals
has ranged from what might be termed malign neglect to virtual
genocide. These animals, including whales, porpoises, seals, sea ot-
ters, polar bears, manatees and others, have only rarely benefitted
from our interest; they have been shot, blown up, clubbed to death,
run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to a multitude of other
indignities, all in the interests of profit or recreation, with little or
no consideration of the potential impact of these activities on the
animal populations involved.
Id. at 4144-45. In the legislative history, Congress also expressed the inability
that government has had in preventing the destruction of marine mammals.
For example, the legislative history states that "another problem to which
marine mammals may be inadvertently exposed is the operation of high-speed
boats. Manatees and sea otters have been crippled and killed by motorboats
and at present the Federal government is essentially powerless to force these
boats to slow down or to curtail their operations." Id. at 4147. In fact, the habit
of manatees' feeding in shallow areas often results in injuries from contact with
boat propellers. Approximately 1,000 manatees exist in the waters surrounding
Florida. The Florida Department of Natural Resources reported in 1987 that
113 manatees were killed by high-speed boats; in 1988, 133 manatees were
killed; in 1989, 160 manatees were killed; and in 1990, 200 manatees were
killed. Many experts have predicted that the manatee could become extinct by
the end of this decade. See Ellen Michaud, Florida's Refuge for the Manatee,
N.Y. Tmms, Dec. 8, 1991, at 16.
30. MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1361(6).
31. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(11).
The term "Secretary" means - (A) the Secretary of the department
in which the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is
operating, as to all responsibility, authority, funding, and duties
under this chapter with respect to members of the order Cetacea
and members, other than walruses, of the order Pinnipedia, and (B)
the Secretary of the Interior as to all responsibility, authority,
1996] 413
5
414 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14
retary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), implements the Act with regard to cetacae32
and pinnipedia33 (excluding walruses) members.3 4 All other
marine mammals (manatees, polar bears, dugongs, sea ot-
ters, and walruses) are the responsibility of the Secretary of
the Interior.3 5 Additionally, an independent advisory board,
the Marine Mammal Commission, was created to assess the
current status of marine mammal stocks and to review the
efficacy of marine mammal protection programs.3 6
Numerous court opinions have given a broad interpreta-
tion to the goals of the MMPA as set forth by Congress. In
Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson,3 7 var-
ious environmental groups challenged the legality of a permit
allowing purse-seine fishing for yellowfin tuna "on por-
poise."38 The district court voided the permit and the United
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit af-
firmed.3 9 In affirming the district court's decision, the court
of appeals agreed that "the [Marine Mammal Protection] Act
funding, and duties under this chapter with respect to all other
marine mammals covered by this chapter. Id.
32. Cetaceans are "of a group of hairless, fishlike water mammals with pad-
dlelike forelimbs: whales, porpoises, and dolphins are cetaceans." WEBSTER'S
NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRMGED DICTIONARY 298 (2d ed. 1983) (emphasis added).
33. Pinnipedia are defined as "a suborder of aquatic carnivorous mammals,
having flippers, including the seals and walruses." Id. at 1365.
34. See BEN, supra note 28, at 284.
35. See id.
36. See id. The Marine Mammal Commission was set up as a three member
group with their primary fumction being to review existing and proposed pro-
grams that affect marine mammals. The Commission is to propose any changes
deemed necessary. "This Commission would be aided in its efforts by a nine-
member Scientific Advisory Committee composed of members qualified to re-
view management and research programs and, if necessary, to carry out its own
search." H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C-A.N. 4144, 4154.
37. 540 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. See id. "On porpoise" refers to a common method of purse-seine fishing.
Dolphins swim on the surface of the water above schools of yellowfin tuna.
Thus, fishermen place seine nets where the dolphins are swimming in order to
catch the yellowfin tuna swimming below them. See MILLER, supra note 3, at
379. See also supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion on purse-
seine fishing.
39. See Comm. for Humane Legislation, 540 F.2d at 1148.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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was to be administered for the benefit of protected species
rather than for the benefit of commercial exploitation."40
Similarly, in Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n v. Secretary of
Commerce,41 the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Secretary of
Commerce from issuing a permit to allow foreign commercial
fishermen to "take" salmon from U.S. waters without first de-
termining the extent to which certain seals would be affected
by the fishing.42 When discussing the MMPA, the court noted
that Congress effected a moratorium on the "taking" of
marine mammals "because it was greatly concerned about
the maintenance of healthy populations of all species of
marine mammals within the ecosystems they inhabit."43 Ad-
ditionally, the court stated that "[t]he MMPA does not allow
for a Solomonic balancing of the animals' and fisheries' inter-
ests such as the Secretary attempted. The interest in main-
taining healthy populations of marine mammals comes first
and the Secretary cannot ignore the fur seals."44 Therefore,
the court held that issuing a permit would be contrary to the
requirements of the MMPA.45
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit, the same circuit that de-
cided Hayashi, has purported broad goals for the MMPA.46
In Balelo v. Baldridge, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of
a regulation that required vessel owners to consent to the
placement of observers on their vessels to take notes on the
incidental "takings" that occurred on the vessel.47 In deter-
mining that the regulation was valid, the Balelo court inter-
40. Id.
41. 839 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
42. See id. at 796.
43. Id. at 801.
44. Id. at 802.
45. See Kokechik Fishermen's Ass'n, 839 F.2d at 802.
46. See Balelo v. Baldridge, 724 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1252 (1984).
47. See id. Regulations, promulgated by the Department of Commerce, re-
quire a "vessel certificate holder of any certified vessel" to "allow an observer
duly authorized by the Secretary to accompany the vessel on any or all regular
fishing trips for the purpose of conducting research and observing operations
.*..." Taking and Related Acts Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations,
50 C.F.R. § 216.24(f)(1) (1996).
1996] 415
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preted Congress' overriding purpose in enacting the MMPA
to be the protection of marine mammals.48 In a compelling
concurrence, Judge Nelson emphasized that "[i]f the world
loses genetic diversity, it has truly suffered irreparable harm.
Marine mammals have long been threatened by the on-
slaught of technology; if we must take drastic steps to avoid
further encroachment, so be it."49
The MMPA is a relatively lengthy, complex statute; the
provision relating to the Hayashi case and the general deter-
rence Amendment, the "taking" provision, is a fundamental
element of the Act.50 The MVIMPA created a moratorium on
the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine
mammal products.5 1 The prohibition against "taking" is
broad. "Take" is defined as "to harass, hunt, capture, kill, or
attempt to harass, hunt, capture, or kill any marine mam-
mal."52 Enacted regulations further define the term "take."5 3
The inclusion of "harassment" within the scope of the defini-
tion of "take" evinces an intent to prohibit even unintentional
acts that adversely affect marine mammals.54 No previous
federal wildlife law had used such a broad understanding of
"taking."5 5
48. See Balelo, 724 F.2d at 756.
49. Id. at 768.
50. See BEAN, supra note 28, at 286.
51. See MAIPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371.
52. Id. § 1362(12).
53. Pursuant to the regulation,
[t]ake means to harass, hunt, capture, collect, or kill, or attempt to
harass, hunt, capture, collect, or kill any marine mammal. This in-
cludes, without limitation, any of the following: The collection of
dead animals, or parts thereof; the restraint or detention of a
marine mammal, no matter how temporary; tagging a marine
mammal; the negligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or
vessel, or the doing of any other negligent or intentional act which
results in disturbing or molesting a marine mammal; and feeding
or attempting to feed a marine mammal in the wild.
50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1995).
54. See BEAN, supra note 28, at 286. "According to the House Committee
Report, '(t~he act of taking need not be intentional: the operation of motor boats
in waters in which these animals are found can clearly constitute harassment.-
Id. at n.21 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144,
4155).
55. See id. at 286.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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A number of exceptions 56 to the moratorium on "taking"
marine mammals were developed by Congress in an effort to
offset the adverse effect of the MMPA on the commercial fish-
ing industry,57 as well as to allow for continued scientific re-
search and public display of mammals.58 Additionally, there
is an exemption for the taking of marine mammals by Alas-
kan natives.59
To punish violators of the MMPA, Congress included
penalty provisions in the Act.60 Penalties for violating any
provision of the MMPA can be either civil or criminal.61 Ad-
ditionally, there is a provision for the seizure and forfeiture of
cargo which is employed in unlawfully taking a marine mam-
mal.62 Congress also incorporated a provision authorizing
56. Section 1371 of the hMfIPA provides exceptions for "taking" marine
mammals.
Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the provisions of
this Act shall not apply to the use of measures - (i) by the owner of
fishing gear or catch, or an employee or agent of such owner, to
deter a marine mammal from damaging the gear or catch; (ii) by
the owner of other private property, or an agent, bailee, or em-
ployee of such owner, to deter a marine mammal from damaging
private property; (iii) by any person, to deter a marine mammal
from endangering personal safety; or (iv) by a government em-
ployee, to deter a marine mammal from damaging public property,
so long as such measures do not result in the death or serious in-
jury of a marine mammal.
MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(4)(A).
57. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 870.
58. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(1)-(2).
59. The exemption for Alaskan natives allows a "taking" for two purposes:
(1) for subsistence purposes; and (2) for creating and selling authentic native
articles of handicrafts and clothing. The latter exemption is restricted to cer-
tain terms, and both exemptions do not apply to acts conducted in a wasteful
manner. See id. § 1371(b).
60. See id § 1375.
61. See id. § 1375(a)(1), (b).
(a)(1) Any person who violates any provision of this subchapter or of
any permit or regulation issued thereunder may be assessed a civil
penalty by the Secretary of not more than $10,000 for each such
violation .... (b) Any person who knowingly violates any provision
of this subchapter or of any permit or regulation issued thereunder
shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $20,000 for each such
violation, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
62. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1376(a)-(b).
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the payment of an award, up to $2,500, to any person who
furnishes information that leads to a conviction under the
MMPA.63
B. Administrative Decisions Interpreting the "Taking"
Provision
1. In re David Gerald Patterson64
In 1980, the Department of Commerce brought a civil
penalty proceeding under the MMPA65 against David Gerald
Patterson alleging that he unlawfully took one or more seals
by shooting at them.66 Patterson and a friend were attempt-
ing to secure a spot for fishing when a California Fish and
Game warden observed Patterson firing a gun at harbor
seals.67 Both shots hit the water near the seals, but whether
any seal was actually hit was disputed. 68
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) presiding over the
case found that the alleged violation occurred as charged.69
In his analysis, the ALJ scrutinized the definition of "take"
and determined that regardless of whether Patterson actu-
ally hit any seal, the seals were disturbed and molested by
the scattered shotgun pellets in their vicinity. 70 Thus, David
Patterson was assessed a penalty of $1,000.71
(a) Any vessel or other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States that is employed in any manner in the unlawful tak-
ing of any marine mammal shall have its entire cargo or the mone-
tary value thereof subject to seizure and forfeiture .... (b) Any
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that is em-
ployed in any manner in the unlawful taking of any marine mam-
mal shall be liable for a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 ....
Id.
63. See id. § 1376(c).
64. 2 O.R.W. 249 (NOAA 1980).
65. MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
66. See Patterson, 2 O.R.W. at 249.
67. See id. at 250.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 251.
71. See Patterson, 2 Q.R.W. at 258. Nine hundred dollars of this penalty
was suspended for two years on the condition that Patterson commit no further
violations of the MMPA during that period. See id. at 256. The motivation be-
hind the compassionate penalty stemmed from Patterson's good faith belief that
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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2. In re Grady L. Oliver7 2
Another penalty proceeding brought under the "taking"
provision charged Grady L. Oliver with three separate counts
of shooting at seals or sea lions on three occasions during a
charter fishing excursion.73 A sport fisherman who was on
the same boat as Oliver testified that Oliver fired a double-
barrelled shotgun at sea lions on three separate occasions. 74
At the time of the shooting, the vessel was approximately
fifty feet from the sea lions and the shots struck in the imme-
diate vicinity of the sea lions.75 Oliver testified that he was
attempting to frighten the sea lions away from the vessel.76
Oliver also was attempting to dissuade the sea lions from
chasing away the salmon.77
In considering the language and purpose of the MMPA,
the ALJ concluded that Oliver's actions constituted a viola-
tion of the MMPA. 78 The ALJ concluded that Oliver's act,
and similar acts of using a lethal weapon to discourage natu-
ral predation, was an impermissible harassment.79 The ALJ
acknowledged that marine mammals have numerous body
cavities suscepting them to a significant chance of shotgun
pellets entering and injuring the mouth, nostrils, eyes, or
blowhole of the mammal.8 0 Oliver was assessed a $15,000
penalty.8 '
he was accorded the exemption of a Native American, and the belief that Native
Americans could hunt and fish. The ALJ considered this civil rights assertion a
powerful and emotional issue. See id.
72. 3 O.R.W. 236 (NOAA 1983).
73. See i.
74. See id. at 237.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Oliver, 3 O.R.W. at 238.
78. See id
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id at 240.
1996] 419
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3. In re Christopher Munkers82
In another case, Christopher Munkers was alleged to
have "taken" a herd of nearly seventy seals by overt actions
when he caused them to retreat into the ocean.s3 A Califor-
nia Department of Fish and Game biologist, who was per-
forming a harbor seal tally, observed Munkers waving his
arms and approaching the seals, causing them to slip into the
water.8 4
In his decision, the ALJ held that Munkers did unlaw-
fully "take", by harassment, approximately sixty marine
mammals 8 5 by intentionally approaching them and causing
them to retreat into
the sea.8 6 Christopher Munkers was fined $200 for his
actions.87
C. The 1994 Amendments to the MMPA
In April of 1994, seven months after the Hayashi deci-
sion, the MMPA was amended to allow the use of general de-
terrence measures on marine mammals to protect a person,
property, fishing gear, or a catch."" This Amendment was a
direct result of the legal dispute in the Hayashi case.8 9 Sec-
tion 4(a)(4) of the Amendment reads:
(A) Except as provided in subparagraphs (B) and (C), the
provisions of this Act shall not apply to the use of meas-
ures-(i) by the owner of fishing gear or catch, or an em-
ployee or agent of such owner, to deter a marine mammal
from damaging the gear or catch; (ii) by the owner of other
82. 4 O.R.W. 707 (NOAA 1986).
83. See id. at 707-08.
84. See id at 708-09.
85. The Department of Commerce alleged the "taking" of seventy marine
mammals. See id. at 707. However, the ALJ concluded that only approxi-
mately sixty seals were taken. See id at 712.
86. See Munkers, 4 O.R.W. at 712.
87. See id. at 713.
88. See MMPA Amendments of 1994, supra note 18, Pub. L. No. 103-238,
108 Stat. 532, 533.
89. See Chmael, supra note 19, at 20.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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private property, or an agent, bailee, or employee of such
owner, to deter a marine mammal from damaging private
property; (iii) by any person, to deter a marine mammal
from endangering personal safety; or (iv) by a government
employee, to deter a marine mammal from damaging pub-
lic property, so long as such measures do not result in the
death or serious injury of a marine mammal. (B) The Sec-
retary shall, through consultation with appropriate ex-
perts, and after notice and opportunity for public comment,
publish in the Federal Register a list of guidelines for use
in safely deterring marine mammals .... (C) If the Secre-
tary determines, using the best scientific information
available, that certain forms of deterrence have a signifi-
cant adverse effect on marine mammals, the Secretary
may prohibit such deterrent methods, after notice and op-
portunity for public comment, through regulation under
this Act.90
On April 28, 1995, proposed regulations were set forth in
the Federal Register that would allow citizens to deter marine
mammals from the following: damaging fishing gear and
catch, damaging private property, endangering public safety,
or damaging public property.9 ' The proposed regulations
contain preliminary versions of guidelines for safely deter-
ring marine mammals and preliminary versions of guidelines
for deterrence measures that would be prohibited under the
ffAPA.92
The deterrence regulations are divided into three catego-
ries: "passive" deterrence measures, "preventive" deterrence
measures, and "reactive" deterrence measures. 93 The "pas-
sive" deterrence measures were designed to prevent marine
mammals from gaining access to property, people, or fishing
90. MMPA Amendments of 1994, supra note 18, Pub. L. No. 103-238, 108
Stat. 532, 533.
91. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Deterrence Regulations
and Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,345 (1995) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 216)
[hereinafter Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals].
92. See id.
93. See id. at 22,345-46.
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gear or catch;94 the "preventive" deterrence measures were
fashioned to dissuade marine mammals from interacting
with property, people, or fishing gear or catch;95 and the "re-
active" deterrence measures were created to stop a dangerous
or damaging interaction. 96
To aid in the proper use of the various deterrence meas-
ures, the proposed rules state that the acts of deterrence
should not: "(1) [rlesult in a separation of a female marine
mammal from its unweaned offspring; (2) break the skin of a
marine mammal; (3) be directed at the head or eyes of a
marine mammal; or (4) be used on pinnipeds hauled out on
unimproved private property (i.e. a rock, ledge, or beach)."97
Beyond these four cautions, the proposed rules include a ca-
veat that any deterrence resulting in serious injury or death
to a marine mammal is unacceptable and would violate the
MMPA.98
III. United States v. Hayashi99
A. Facts
David Hayashi and his son were fishing for AhPi10 off the
coast of Hawaii on January 24, 1991.101 At one point during
the fishing trip, four porpoises began to chase and eat the
94. See id. at 22,345. The proposed rules for "passive" measures would in-
clude the use of predator nets, rigid fencing, or other fixed barriers. See id. at
22,346.
95. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. 22,346. These measures would include using underwater acoustic devices
that generate sounds known to be annoying, certain light explosives to startle
marine mammals, or boat hazing (boat noise or using nets to block marine
mammal approach). See id.
96. See id. at 22,346. Included under 'reactive" measures are the following:
prodding a marine mammal with blunt poles, pushing or herding an animal
with plywood or canvas, spraying mammals with water, and using noisemakers
and light explosives. See id.
97. Id.
98. See i&L
99. 22 F.3d 859.
100. Ahi is the Hawaiian word for tuna. See Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee
at 1, United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 91-10044) [here-
inafter Appellees Brief].
101. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
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tuna off the Hayashis' lines.10 2 In an attempt to deter the
porpoises from biting at the tuna, David Hayashi fired two
rifle shots into the water, to the immediate rear of the
porpoises.' 0 3 At the time of the shooting, Hayashi's boat was
approximately twenty-five yards from the porpoises.' 0 4 The
four porpoises were not hit by the rifle shots.'0 5 Upon reeling
the fishing lines in, Mr. Hayashi and his son discovered that
a portion of one of the tuna had been eaten.' o6
Later, a state enforcement officer notified the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) that someone had fired
shots at dolphins from Hayashi's boat.'0 7 In February 1991,
NMFS agents interviewed Hayashi and his son and took
written statements from them.OB
B. Procedural History
In April of 1991, Hayashi was charged by the United
States Attorney's Office with "knowingly taking" a marine
mammal in violation of the MMPA.109 Thereafter, the par-
ties consented to proceed on stipulated facts before a Magis-
trate Judge.1 0 The stipulated facts consisted of the
following: the Hayashis' statements, the NMFS report, and
notes from the interviews with Hayashi and his son.']l
Hayashi's motion to dismiss for unconstitutional vagueness
was denied by the Magistrate Judge, and Hayashi was subse-
102. See id.
103. See Appellee's Brief at 1, Hayashi (No. 91-10044).
104. See id. at 2.
105. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. The "taking" provision provides: "[i]t is unlawful... for any
person or vessel or other conveyance to take any marine mammal in waters or
on lands under the jurisdiction of the United States .... ." MMPA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1372(a)(2)(A).
110. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
111. See id.
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quently convicted. 112  The Magistrate Judge sentenced
Hayashi to one year of unsupervised probation. 113
Upon conviction, the defendant appealed to the district
court on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague and that the evidence was insufficient. 1 4 The district
court affirmed the defendant's conviction"15 and ruled that
the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that there
was sufficient evidence to prove Hayashi's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.1 6 Following the affirmance, the defendant
filed a timely appeal to the United States Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Ninth Circuit, challenging the lower courts' findings on
both grounds. 127
The court of appeals reversed the lower courts' decisions,
holding that the act of firing rifle shots into the water to di-
vert dolphins from fishing lines could not be the basis of crim-
inal liability under the MMPA.118 Thus, there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and the issue
of unconstitutional vagueness was not addressed." 9 The
case was decided on September 27, 1993, with an Order
Amending Opinion on Denial of Rehearing and Rehearing En
Bane on April 26, 1994.120
112. See id.
113. See Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, United States v.
Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1994) (No. 92-10044) [hereinafter Appellant's
Opening Brief].
114. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text for a further discussion of the grounds upon which Hayashi's appeal was
based.
115. See id.
116. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-2, Hayashi (No. 92-10044).
117. See id. at 2.
118. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 860-61. See infra notes 148-53 and accompany-
ing text for an explanation of why criminal charges against Hayashi were not
appropriate.
119. See Hayashi, at 861 n.1.
120. See id. at 859.
With these amendments, a majority of the panel has voted to deny
the appellee's petition for rehearing. An active judge made a sua
sponte request to rehear the case en banc. The government also
requested en banc rehearing in its response papers. The matter
failed to receive a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active
judges in favor of en banc consideration. FED. R. APP. P. 35. The
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
UNITED STATES V. HAYASHI
C. The Court of Appeals' Majority Decision' 2 '
In the majority's discussion of the charges against
Hayashi for violating the "takings" provision of the MMPA, 122
the court explained that penalties under the "takings" provi-
sion can be either civil or criminal;123 however, a criminal
conviction requires a mens rea of "knowingly".124 Hayashi
was charged under the MMPA for "taking" a marine mammal
in U.S. waters. 125
According to the MMPA, "take" is defined as "to harass,
hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or
kill any marine mammal."126 The government agreed with
the court of appeals that "harass" or "attempt to harass" were
the only possible terms that may apply to the defendant's ac-
tions. 127 Neither the statute nor the regulations implement-
ing the statute defines "harass", but the definition of "take" is
extended in the implementing regulations to include: "the
doing of any other negligent or intentional act which results
in disturbing or molesting a marine mammal...."18 The
court of appeals decided that the "disturbing or molesting"
clause was the only provision that may be applied to the de-
fendant's actions, and it subsequently concluded that the reg-
ulation does not reach Hayashi's conduct. 29
Before supporting its conclusion, the court of appeals ad-
dressed errors that were committed by both parties and the
petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en
banc is rejected.
Id. at 860.
121. Id. at 861-66.
122. See MIVMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(2)(A).
123. See supra note 61-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pen-
alty provisions in the MMPA.
124. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1375(b). "Any person who knowingly violates
any provision of this subchapter ... shall, upon conviction, be fined not more
than $20,000 for each such violation, or imprisoned for not more than one year,
or both." Id.
125. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
126. MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1372.
127. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861.
128. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3.
129. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 861-62.
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lower courts.' 30 First, the parties employed the incorrect reg-
ulatory definition of a "taking" under the MMPA, and subse-
quently, this definition was incorrectly adopted by both the
Magistrate Judge and the district court.' 3 ' The United
States Attorney's Office incorrectly set forth the regulatory
definition of "harass" at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.132 This regulation
defines "harass" as: "an intentional or negligent act or omis-
sion which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by an-
noying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal
behavioral patterns which include ... breeding, feeding, or
sheltering." 33 The government also included the regulatory
definition of "harass" at 50 C.F.R. § 216.3134 in its brief, but
argued that § 17.3 was more appropriate. 35 Following the
plaintiffs lead, the defendant promoted this regulatory defi-
nition of "harass" as well, and the lower courts adopted the
definition in its analysis.'3 6
The use of 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 was error because it is a reg-
ulation issued by the National Fish and Wildlife Service,
under the Department of the Interior, for implementing the
Endangered Species Act.' 37 This error was compounded by
the fact that § 17.3 includes negligent conduct in the defini-
tion, while the information charged Hayashi with "know-
ingly" taking. 38 Thus, the district court's conclusion rested
on the erroneous belief that a criminal conviction, under the
MMPA, could be found by negligent conduct.' 39 The court of
130. See id. at 862.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. 50 Co.F.R. § 17.3 (1995).
134. See supra note 53 for the regulatory definition of "take" that applies to
the M1PA.
135. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 862.
136. See id.
137. See id. Endangered Species Act (ESA) §§ 2-18, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44
(1994).
138. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 863.
139. See id.
In addressing Hayashi's insufficiency claim, the district court held
that, '[fliring the rifle in waters containing porpoises was a negli-
gent act that created a likelihood of injury to the porpoises.'
Although it went on to suggest that the evidence also showed an
intentional attempt to stop the porpoises from eating, the district
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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appeals conceded that § 17.3 could be useful authority, but
only the facially applicable regulatory definition could be
used to convict Hayashi. 140 Essentially, the defendant was
convicted under the wrong regulatory definition and the in-
correct mens rea.
Although the previous decisions were marred by error,141
the court of appeals decided to continue its analysis rather
than dismiss the case; it was able to do so because the case
was not tried before a jury, and so there was a clear factual
record to review without perpetuating the fundamental er-
rors previously made. Therefore, the court considered
whether there was sufficient evidence to convict the
defendant.142
Judge Reinhardt and the majority found the terms "har-
ass", "disturb", and "molest" to be rather general terms that
must be considered in their context. 143 Following the rule of
statutory construction, noscitur a sociis,144 which states that
words in a list should be given related meaning, the court of
appeals grouped "harass" with "hunt", "capture", and
"kdll".14 5 Since the court of appeals determined "hunt", "cap-
ture", and "kill" to be "direct intrusions" upon the normal ac-
court's erroneous belief that negligence could support an MMPA
criminal conviction tainted its consideration of Hayashi's appeal.
Id.
140. See id. at 863-64.
141. In addition to the errors that the court dealt with, there was a contro-
versy over who represented the United States. The United States Attorney's
Office filed a brief and argued the case in the court of appeals; however, upon
reaching the court of appeals, other branches of the Department of Justice are
to represent the United States. Telephone Interview with Edward H. Kubo,
Assistant U.S. Attorney, District of Hawaii (Oct. 8, 1995).
142. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 863.
143. See id. at 864.
144. See id. (citing Third Nat-1 Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., 432 U.S.
312, 322 (1977)). Noscitur a sociis is the doctrine of statutory construction that
determines the meaning of a word from its accompanying words. See BLAcK's
LAw DiCFIONARY 956 (6th ed. 1991).
145. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864.
The latter three each involve direct and significant intrusions upon
the normal, life-sustaining activities of a marine mammal; killing is
a direct and permanent intrusion, while hunting and capturing
cause significant disruptions of a marine mammal's natural state.
Consistent with these other terms, 'harassment,' to constitute a
19961 427
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tivities of a marine mammal, it held that for "harassment" to
reach the level of a "taking", it must entail a "direct intru-
sion" similar to the other terms. 146 The court of appeals fur-
thered this "direct intrusion" reasoning by making a common
sense argument that "take" strongly suggests a serious dis-
ruption of the mammal's routine.147
The majority opined that its deduction comports with 50
C.F.R. § 216.3 and the MMPA because the underlying con-
cern of the prohibition against disturbing mammals was to
protect them in nature, not when they are endangering life or
property.148 "Interpreting the act and regulations otherwise,
as prohibiting isolated interference with abnormal marine
mammal activity, would lead to absurdity .... Nothing could
legally be done to save a modern-day Jonah from the devour-
ing whale, or to deter a rampaging polar bear from mauling a
child."49
The court of appeals concluded that the porpoises were
engaged in an act' 50 that was not part of their normal eating
habit,' 51 and the defendant's firing of rifle shots was not sig-
taking' under the MIMPA, must entail a similar level of direct
intrusion.
Id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 864. "Interpreting harassment' under the MMPA to involve a
direct and significant intrusion also comports with a common understanding of
the term 'take,' of which 'harass' is simply one form. To 'take' a marine mam-
mal strongly suggests a serious diversion of the mammal from its natural rou-
tine." Id. In further support of their reasoning, the court used the legislative
history that refers to marine mammals that "have been shot, blown up, dubbed
to death, run down by boats, poisoned, and exposed to a multitude of other in-
dignities.' See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 864 n.12 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-707,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C-.AN. 4144, 4144). The court used this quote to rea-
son that a "taking" must be a seriously intrusive act. See id.
148. See id. at 865.
149. Id.
150. The porpoises were eating or attempting to eat the tuna being reeled in
by the Hayashis' fishing lines. See id. at 861.
151. Human feeding of marine mammals potentially could lead to dangerous
modifications of their normal feeding patterns because they might become de-
pendent upon feeding off of fishing lines. See Feeding Populations of Marine
Mammals in the Wild, 56 Fed. Reg. 11,693, 11,696 (1991), codified at 50 C.F.R.
216.
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nificant enough to be a "taking".152 Therefore, criminal liabil-
ity could not be attached to the defendant.15 3
D. The Court of Appeals' Dissent'5 4
In his dissent, Circuit Judge Browning deemed the ma-
jority's decision an unjustifiable restriction of the breadth of
the MMPA to avoid subjecting Hayashi to a criminal prosecu-
tion that the majority regarded as unreasonable. 155 Judge
Browning saw this restriction as ignoring the purpose of the
MMPA and weakening the MMPA's public policy as set forth
by Congress. 5 6
While the majority regarded a conviction of Hayashi as
unreasonable, Judge Browning regarded the decision as im-
plicating much more than Hayashi's freedom; it involved de-
fining the scope of the Secretary's authority to regulate
activities that affect marine mammals.' 5 7 The means by
which the Secretary ensures the protection and survival of
marine mammals stems directly from the "taking" provi-
sion.' 58 The restrictive view that the majority adopted re-
garding the term "take" curtails the core provision of the
MMPA, the "takings" provision, as envisioned by Congress
when the MMPA was enacted in 1972.159
Judge Browning explained in his analysis of the MNMPA's
legislative history, statutory language, and implementing
regulations that these provisions all point to a sufficiently
broad interpretation of "take" which would encompass the de-
fendant's act of deliberately firing his rifle near porpoises.' 60
Congress' goal in enacting the MMPA was "the optimum pro-
tection of the marine mammals affected by the bill."' 6 '
152. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865.
153. See id. at 866.
154. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 866-71 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 866.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 867.
159. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 867 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
160. See id.
161. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.CA.N.
4144, 4147-48).
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Terms such as "harass" were used to broaden the definition of
"taking".162 In fact, Judge Browning noted that the Com-
merce Department proposed to eliminate "harassment" for
being too broad, but Congress rejected that proposal. 63
After discussing the breadth of the MMPA, Judge
Browning rejected the reasoning behind the majority deci-
sion. First, the dissent dismissed the majority's reliance on
the rule of statutory construction, noscitur a sociis,164 which
states that words in a list should be given a related meaning.
Judge Browning pointed out that a word must have a charac-
ter of its own that is not submerged by its association with
other words. 165 He reasoned that "harass", "hunt", "capture",
and "Iill" all relate to varying degrees of intrusiveness, and
that therefore, the word "harass" must have a specific mean-
ing of its own.166 Browning also pointed out that when a rule
of construction conflicts with the clear intent of Congress, the
rule of construction should be ignored. 167 Since the legisla-
tive history and statutory language indicate a broad interpre-
tation of the "take" provision, the application of noscitur a
sociis was in direct conflict with Congress' intent and was,
therefore, an erroneous employment of statutory
construction.168
Judge Browning found further support for his argument
that a "taking" does not require a "direct and significant in-
trusion," as the majority suggested, from 50 C.F.R. § 216.3.169
162. See id. at 867.
163. See id. at 868 (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4157).
164. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
165. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868 n.3 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting) (citing
Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514 (1923)).
166. See id. at 868.
167. See id. (citing Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354, 359 (9th
Cir. 1990)).
168. See id. at 868 n.3 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
169. See id. at n.4. 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 reads, in part:
taking includes: to harass, hunt, capture, collect, or kill, or attempt
to harass, hunt, capture, collect, or kill, any marine mammal. This
includes, without limitation, any of the following: The collection of
dead animals, or parts thereof; tagging a marine mammal; the neg-
ligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or vessel, or the doing
of any other negligent or intentional act which results in disturbing
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/21
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A restraint or detention, no matter how temporary, is a "tak-
ing", but does not seem to be a "direct and significant intru-
sion."170 The regulatory inclusion of the collection of dead
animals is also in conflict with the majority's requirement of
a "direct and significant intrusion" on life-sustaining activi-
ties.171 Additionally, Judge Browning noted, the tagging of a
marine mammal is a humane means of tracking mammals
with minimal intrusion on their activities, yet it is also cov-
ered in the regulatory definition of "take".172 Therefore,
Judge Browning concluded that a "taking" under the MMPA
is much less restrictive than the majority's view. 7 3
The dissent also found the majority's opinion that the
"take" provision only applies to normal mammal behavior,
and their subsequent characterization of the porpoises' ac-
tions as abnormal, to be unfounded.' 7 4 Judge Browning
opined that restricting the scope of the "taking" definition to
"normal marine mammal behavior" would require courts and
regulators to formulate a system of rules around the elusive
concept of "normal marine mammal behavior." 75 Further-
more, the porpoises in question were not behaving abnor-
mally, for they were "merely competing with Hayashi for the
same catch."176 One of the main purposes of the MMPA is to
protect marine mammals from the harm created by the fish-
ing industry. 77 Excluding activities such as those of the
or molesting a marine mammal; and feeding or attempting to feed a
marine mammal in the wild.
50 C.F.R. § 216.3.
170. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 868-69 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 869 n.5.
174. "[The porpoises] were merely competing with Hayashi for the same
catch." Id at 869.
175. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 869 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
176. See id
177. See id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4147-48). For a discussion of the purpose of the MMPA, see supra notes
23-29 and accompanying text.
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porpoises 78 in the case at bar frustrates this main purpose of
the MMPA. 179
Further support for Circuit Judge Browning's rejection of
the majority's holding can be found in the "taking" exemp-
tions and exceptions codified in the MMPA and its regula-
tions.' 80 A 1988 Amendment to the MMPA gave commercial
fishermen an exemption' 8 ' to "take" marine mammals to pro-
tect catch, gear, or person, as long as the action was "not ex-
pected to cause death or injury to a marine mammal."18 2
Judge Browning opined that the existence of this statutory
and regulatory exemption for commercial fishermen contra-
dicts the majority's decision.'8 3 Hayashi shot at the porpoises
to protect his catch.'8 4 The dissent stated that if an act to
protect catch was not prohibited, the Secretary would not
have promulgated an exception to such conduct.' 8 5 Judge
Browning noted that, in essence, the majority extended the
exemption to all fishermen, not just commercial fishermen as
the Secretary authorized.' 8 6 It is not within the court's power
to apply a commercial fisherman's exemption to a non-com-
mercial fisherman.' 8 7 Judge Browning noted that Congress'
purpose in creating the MMPA with exceptions was to protect
178. See supra note 150 for a description of the porpoises activities.
179. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 869 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
180. The Secretary was given the power to promulgate exceptions and ex-
emptions where necessary. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1371(3)(A). Permits al-
lowing "takings" may be issued for commercial fishermen, scientific purposes,
public display, and Alaskan natives. See id. §§ 1374, 1371(b). Aside from these
exceptions, all "takings" are barred by the MVIMPA. See id, § 1371.
181. See supra note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exemp-
tions to the "takings" provision of the MMPA.
182. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 870 (citing 50 C.F.R. §§ 229.6(c)(5), 229.7(d))
(Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
183. See id at 870.
184. Although Hayashi was a part-time commercial fisherman, he did not
claim that his activities fell under the commercial fisherman exemption, and
the record did not permit a determination of that question. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. "It is irrelevant that the majority extends to non-commercial fishermen
only 'some portion of the protections' afforded to commercial fishermen by Con-
gress and the Secretary, or that the protections the majority extends to non-
commercial fishermen are moderate and reasonable, if indeed they are."
Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 870 (Browning, Cir. J., dissenting).
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dolphins without completely destroying the tuna industry.188
Non-commercial fishing was not included in the exceptions
because it does not involve a large economic interest that
Congress wished to protect.189
Judge Browning concluded his dissent by noting that the
Secretary has the authority to strike a balance between the
protection of marine mammals and the health of the commer-
cial fishing economy. 190 However, the majority's approach of
adding an exemption to non-commercial fishermen renders
the Secretary's power to implement the MMPA meaning-
less.' 91 Browning concluded by stating that "[t]he majority's
view is bad policy as well as bad law."192
IV. Analysis of the Decision
The most striking problem with the Hayashi decision is
that the defendant's acts appear to be a clear violation of the
MMPA. "[Tihe Defendant's shots were done with an intent to
'disturb' the porpoises because he admitted that he intended
to 'scare' them."193 The MMPA's enacting regulations clearly
define "take" as "to disturb or molest."194 The fear, the in-
creased heart rate, and the feeling of uncertainty when four
rifle shots explode into the water would be a disturbing event
to any human being. Certainly, a porpoise would be just as
disturbed.
Administrative law judges consistently have held that
firing a weapon at a marine mammal, similar to Hayashi's
188. See id.
189. See id. at 871.
190. See id.
191.
The Secretary has the expertise and ability to study the effects of
commercial fishing techniques on marine mammals and to expand
or contract an exemption as new information evolves. Under the
majority's approach, an exemption for non-commercial fishing is
written into the definition of "taking," and the Secretary is power-
less to alter the exemption or impose conditions or limitations upon
it.
Id. at 870.
192. Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 870.
193. Appellee's Brief at 6, Hayashi (No. 91-10044).
194. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.3.
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action, is a violation of the "take" provision of the MMPA.195
In fact, many defendants have been convicted for actions
much less disturbing than Hayashi's. For example, Christo-
pher Munkers was fined for violating the "take" provision
merely for approaching marine mammals and waving his
arms. 19 6 More closely on point, Grady L. Oliver was assessed
a monetary penalty after firing a shotgun at sea lions. 197
Just as Hayashi attempted to "scare" the porpoises, Oliver
testified that he intended to "frighten" the sea lions.' 98 David
Gerald Patterson also was fined for firing shots at harbor
seals.199 The harbor seals were not hit by the shots, but the
mere act of shooting was a harassment.
Although these actions were all administrative actions,
they still involved the interpretation of the "take" provision
as applied to shooting at or scaring marine mammals. It
seems unreasonable that the majority failed to consider the
firing of four rifle shots at a group of porpoises a "harass-
ment" when the three aforementioned actions concluded that
the shooting at and the 'Trightening" of marine mammals is a
"harassment" in violation of the MMPA.
The majority's decision also contradicts with the MMPA's
goals and purpose. "The evident purpose of the MMPA was to
protect these mammals in their natural habitat."200 Allowing
a non-commercial fisherman to fire rifle shots at porpoises,
without punishment, is far from protecting marine mammals
in their natural habitat.
The majority contended that the "take" provision does
not apply when marine mammals act in an abnormal man-
ner, and that the dolphins in the Hayashi case were not act-
ing pursuant to normal dolphin behavior. This contention
can be refuted in two ways. First, porpoises are not acting
abnormally when chasing tuna. It is commonplace for dol-
195. See supra notes 64-87 and accompanying text.
196. See Munkers, 4 O.R.W. at 707, 709.
197. See Oliver, 3 O.R.W. at 240.
198. See id. at 237.
199. See Patterson, 2 O.R.W. at 249.
200. Appellee's Brief at 9, Hayashi (No. 91-10044).
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phins and tuna to swim together.201 Thus, by his actions, the
defendant significantly disrupted the porpoises' normal be-
havioral pattern of feeding. Additionally, there is no provi-
sion in the MMPA that requires "normal" mammal behavior
for the "take" provision to apply. It would be nonsensical not
to use deterrent measures to protect oneself from an abnor-
mal attack, such as deterring a rampaging polar bear from
mauling a child, to which the majority compared dolphins
chasing tuna.20 2 However, the majority cannot read a re-
quirement of normal behavior into the statute. There is too
little known about marine mammal behavior for this require-
ment to be plausible.
If "normal" marine mammal behavior were required for
the "take" provision to apply, the Commerce Department and
the Department of Interior would have the unmanageable job
of differentiating between normal marine mammal behavior
and abnormal marine mammal behavior. In fact, part of the
impetus behind the MMPA was scientists' belief that marine
mammals play a vital role in the marine ecosystem.203 This
impetus reflects the lack of scientific certainty regarding
marine mammals because it was the scientists' belief that led
to the protection of marine mammals, not the scientists' cer-
tainty.20 4 If scientists do not have conclusive knowledge re-
garding normal marine mammal behavior, then certainly the
Department of Commerce and the Department of Interior
would not be capable of determining what constitutes normal
marine mammal behavior. Further support for this conten-
tion can be found in the MMPA provision, which specifically
exempts permitted scientists from the "take" provision, so
that they may continue to research and attempt to under-
stand marine mammal behavior.20 5
201. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
202. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865.
203. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
204. "It is undeniable that the levels of knowledge of scientists on marine
mammals are very low." H.R. REP. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4144, 4152.
205. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(3).
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The majority held that a person's actions must manifest
a "direct intrusion" on the activities of a marine mammal to
be punishable under the "take" provision of the MMPA.206
However, the requirement of a "direct intrusion" on the activ-
ities of marine mammals conflicts with the congressional in-
tent behind the enactment of the MMPA. Additionally, this
requirement creates a narrow construction of the term "take"
while the goals of the MMPA provide for a broad interpreta-
tion of its provisions.20 7 Furthermore, the MMPA's legisla-
tive history indicates that the Department of Commerce
considered the MMPA definition of "take" to be too broad and
proposed to delete the term 'harass" from the definition of
"take. 208 However, the MMPA's inclusion of the term shows
that Congress was satisfied with the liberal construction of
"take" and neglected to heed the Commerce Department's
suggestion.20 9 Additionally, the activities labelled as a "take"
under 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 include many activities that result in
little intrusion on marine mammal activities2 10 and show
that the regulators followed Congress' lead in affecting a lib-
eral construction of the term "take". Thus, it can be seen that
Congress set forth a broad interpretation of "take" and the
majority, in Hayashi, unjustifiably restricted that
interpretation.
Another problem with the decision is that it transgresses
the concept of checks and balances. In the Hayashi case, the
court infringed on the power of Congress, as well as on the
Commerce Department's authority. By exempting Hayashi
from the "take" provision, the majority effectively extended
an exemption that was expressly granted only to commercial
fishermen to non-commercial fishermen also. This action is
outside the scope of the court's power and restricts the power
of Congress and the Department of Commerce to implement
206. See Hayashi, 22 F.3d at 865; see supra notes 121-53 and accompanying
text.
207. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
208. See H.R. REp. No. 92-707, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4157,
4198-4201.
209. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
210. See supra note 169 for the regulatory definition of take under 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.3.
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amendments and regulations to the MMPA. Had the act of
"taking" marine mammals not been prohibited, the Com-
merce Department would not have created an exception for
commercial fishermen; and had Congress or the Commerce
Department wished to extend such an exemption to non-com-
mercial fishermen, it would have been expressly codified in
the C.F.R. or the MMPA.
V. Analysis of the 1994 Amendment and Proposed
Regulations
As a direct result of the Hayashi decision, Congress
passed an amendment21' to the MMPA allowing general de-
terrence measures to be used to protect fishing gear, catch,
and personal/public property. Thus far, only the proposed
regulations have been set forth by the Department of Com-
merce. 212 The proposed regulations will have the effect of un-
dermining the goals of the MMPA because the proposed
regulations are vague and ill-prepared.
The 1994 Amendment allowing the use of general deter-
rent measures on marine mammals is a prime example of
how the 104th Congress is gutting environmental laws. For
some environmental laws, such as the Endangered Species
Act,213 Congress has initiated an indirect attack on the law
by attempting to slash the law's primary source of funding.21 4
Another example includes the use of attaching riders to bills
in order to weaken certain environmental laws.215 Other
times, such as with the MMPA, Congress enacts an amend-
211. See MMPA Amendments of 1994, supra note 18, Pub. L. No. 103-238,
108 Stat. 532.
212. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. 22,345.
213. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44.
214. The House and Senate Spending Bill proposed to eliminate much of the
Endangered Species Act's funding. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Spending Bill
Would Reverse Nation's Environment Policy, N.Y. Tnsns, Sept. 22, 1995, at A4.
215. The 104th Congress attached a rider to the National Highway System
Bill (S. 440) that barred the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency from imple-
menting a Clean Air Act program that required the use of better systems for
inspecting autos for pollution. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CoUNCm, THE
YEAR OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY: CONGRESS AND THE ENViRoNMENT IN 1995 20
(Dec. 1995).
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ment with the potential of defacing the environmental law,2 16
and cuts the budget for the law's implementing agency.217
The future of our environmental laws seems to be in
jeopardy.218
Although the Amendment to allow general deterrence
measures will not completely gut the MMPA, many aspects of
the Amendment will hinder the progress that the MMPA has
made since 1972.219 It is reasonable to allow fishermen to use
certain deterrent measures to protect themselves, and, in
some instances, their property.220 However, it seems unrea-
sonable to allow fishermen to deter marine mammals from
interfering with their catch. Defending one's person or prop-
erty from damage is extremely different from defending a
possible fishing catch from interference by a marine mam-
mal. When one's person or property is in jeopardy, there is a
risk of injury or death to that person; however, when a
marine mammal interferes with a catch, the marine mammal
is merely attempting to feed from its normal diet. Surely, if
two fishermen managed to hook the same fish, it would not be
acceptable for one fisherman to fire light explosives at or to
hit the other fisherman. Yet, the Amendment and the pro-
posed regulations purport to allow the average fisherman to
do just that to marine mammals. Should these regulations be
216. See MMPA Amendments of 1994, supra note 18, Pub. L. No. 103-238,
108 Stat. 532.
217. See infra notes 247-51 and accompanying text for a discussion regard-
ing Congressional budgeting.
218. It is difficult to forecast the extent to which environmental laws, such as
the MMPA, will be eviscerated, especially with Congressmen such as the House
Majority Whip DeLay (R.-TEX), who has proposed to completely repeal the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. See H.R. 479, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). See also NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, STATE OF NATURE
(Dec. 8, 1995). DeLay also coined this year's Nobel Peace Prize, awarded to the
researchers that first identified the stratospheric ozone threat, the "Nobel Ap-
peasement Prize." See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, THE YEAR OF
LiVING DANGERousLY: CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN 1995 8 (Dec. 1995).
219. See infra notes 245-49 and accompanying text.
220. The proposed regulations do not mention how severe damage to prop-
erty must be to warrant deterrence measures. This is another example of flaws
in the proposed regulations. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals,
supra note 91, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,345.
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codified, the MMPA will be one more environmental law to
suffer at the hands of the 104th Congress.
These new proposed regulations attempt to exempt non-
commercial fishermen from certain protective aspects of the
"take" provision. The regulations protect public property, pri-
vate property, personal safety, and fishing gear or catch. De-
terrent measures may be used to protect these interests, so
long as the action does not result in the death or serious in-
jury of a marine mammal.2 2 ' The proposed rules suggest var-
ious measures for fishermen to use when attempting to deter
marine mammals. 222 These measures are categorized as
"passive",223 "preventive, 224 and "reactive. 225
One problem with the proposed rules is that the Depart-
ment of Commerce failed to define the degree of possible dam-
age that is required to allow the use of deterrent measures as
it relates to the property, catch, or person. The rules do not
delineate what constitutes the serious injury that is prohib-
ited. Further, the proposed regulations fail to define the lim-
its of many of the deterrence measures. For example, some of
the noisemaking measures may be safe at one frequency
level, but may cause serious injury at another frequency
level.
"Boat hazing" is recommended as a "preventive" measure
in the proposed regulations. 226 The proposed regulations de-
fine boat hazing as "patrolling a net or an area in a small boat
and deterring marine mammals with boat noise or by block-
ing their approach at the surface."227 This definition is too
ambiguous to be enacted as part of the regulations because it
does not provide adequate guidelines for fishermen to ensure
marine mammal safety. A proper speed and a proper dis-
tance for the boats should be specified to ensure that no
221. See id. at 22,346.
222. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
223. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 22,346.
224. See id,
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
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marine mammal will suffer injury from the boat hazing. The
Marine Mammal Center suggested, in its public comments,
that a minimum approach distance be specified to prevent
boat strikes and propeller wounds to marine mammals.228
Similarly, the Center for Marine Conservation mentioned the
likelihood of injuries that would result from the impact of
vessels on marine mammals. 229 Furthermore, in enacting
the MMPA, Congress expressed concern over the deaths and
injuries suffered by marine mammals at the hands of boat
operators.230 Without specific boat speeds and distances to
ensure marine mammal safety, this proposed deterrent mea-
sure will be inapposite to one of the congressional concerns
that led to the enactment of the MMPA in 1972.
The proposed regulations relating to "preventive" and
"reactive" measures recommend the use of light explosives on
pinnipeds.231 While the proposed rules claim that there is no
evidence of light explosives causing adverse effects on marine
mammals, 23 2 some scientists argue that light explosives can
produce hearing loss and internal injuries in marine mam-
mals.23 3 Furthermore, particles of rock and sand may be-
come dislodged by the blast and inflict injuries upon marine
mammals.
228. See Letter from Krista Hanni, Director of Science, The Marine Mammal
Center, to William W. Fox, Jr., Director, Office of Protected Resources, National
Marine Fisheries Service (June 30, 1995) (on file with author).
229. See Letter from Nina M. Young, Marine Mammologist, Center for
Marine Conservation, to Dr. William W. Fox, Jr., Director, Office of Protected
Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service (June 30, 1995) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Letter from Nina M. Young]. The Center for Marine Conser-
vation mentions the impact of vessels on marine mammals as potentially
causing blunt trauma or resulting in dislocation or fracture of limbs or append-
ages. See id.
230. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
231. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 22,346.
232. See id.
233. See Letter from Albert C. Myrick, Jr., Wildlife Biologist, to William W.
Fox, Jr., Director, Office of Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (June 20, 1995) (on file with author). Mr. Myrick goes so far as to suggest
that the authors of the proposed regulations volunteer as swimming targets for
the so-called insignificant devices. See id.
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Light explosives are only proposed for use on pinni-
peds;234 however, this does not provide sufficient protection to
cetacaens that are in the vicinity of the fishermen using light
explosives on a pinniped. To protect cetacae members, the
Department of Commerce should determine a minimum dis-
tance from cetacaens that a fisherman must be in order to use
light explosives on a pinniped.
The "reactive" measures also suggest the prodding of
marine mammals with blunt poles.23 5 Prodding marine
mammals with blunt poles could cause serious injury to the
mammals. Dislocation or fracturing of limbs and appendages
may occur when fishermen prod the marine mammals.236
Other difficulties may result if a blunt pole becomes lodged in
a marine mammal's orifice or if fishermen strikes the mam-
mal, rather than prod the mammal. The regulations specify
that acts of deterrence that result in serious injury to marine
mammals are prohibited;23 7 however, the prodding of mam-
mals with a blunt pole seems highly likely to result in serious
injury.
"Noisemakers" are recommended for use as "reactive"
measures to stop dangerous or damaging interactions.238 The
Marine Mammal Commission has expressed concern over
whether the unrestricted use of noisemakers is truly safe.2 39
Some types of noises may have the adverse effect of driving
marine mammals out of important habitats. 240 Adverse ef-
fects, such as forcing marine mammals to abandon habitats,
offset the goal of the MMPA to preserve the marine
ecosystem.
234. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 22,346.
235. See id.
236. See Letter from Nina M. Young, supra note 229.
237. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 22,345.
238. See id at 22,346.
239. See Letter from John R. Twiss, Jr., Executive Director, Marine Mammal
Commission, to Dr. William W. Fox, Jr., Director, Office of Protected Resources,
National Marine Fisheries Service (Aug. 30, 1995) (on file with author).
240. See id.
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The regulations propose "underwater acoustic devices" as
"preventive" measures. 241 One wildlife specialist argued
against the use of such devices because of the adverse im-
pacts they could have on "non-target" species.242 The fre-
quencies at which these acoustic devices operate may drive
marine mammals out of feeding areas.2 43 The MMPA was in-
tended to protect resources without disrupting marine mam-
mal behavior. The legislative history of the MMPA includes
the health and stability of the marine ecosystem as a goal of
the MMPA.2 If marine mammals are driven out of impor-
tant and traditional feeding areas, the health and stability of
the marine ecosystem is weakened, and thus, the goals of the
MMPA are undermined.
The Department of Commerce is responsible for imple-
menting regulations that promote the protection of cetaceans
and pinnipeds.245 With the 1994 Amendment, the Commerce
Department has proposed regulations that likely will subject
more marine mammals to injury and death. Additionally,
regulations that provide for the use of numerous deterrent
measures that have not been proven safe were proposed by
the Department.
The proposed regulations should not be codified until the
Department of Commerce performs substantial studies indi-
cating that the proposed measures are the safest available
means of deterring marine mammals. It seems unlikely that
the Department of Commerce will have the opportunity to
perform any studies sufficiently comprehensive to deem any
means of deterrence truly safe. Currently, the 104th Con-
gress also has proposed to cut environmental spending in,
241. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals, supra note 91, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 22,346.
242. See Letter from Sharon B. Young, Wildlife Specialist, The Humane Soci-
ety of the United States, to Dr. William W. Fox, Jr., Director, Office of Protected
Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service (June 31, 1995) (on file with
author).
243. See id.
244. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
245. See MMPA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407.
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among others, the Department of Commerce. 246 Specifically,
the 104th Congress has proposed to cut the Ocean and
Coastal Management budget by eight percent, as opposed to
the President's ten percent proposed budget increase. 247
Congress also proposed a budget for Fisheries research and
development that was ten percent lower than the President's
request.248  Congressional proposals are approximately
twelve million dollars and twenty-one million dollars less
than the President's requests, respectively. 249 Each of these
programs operate under the authority of the Department of
Commerce. 250 If these proposed budget cuts pass for the fis-
cal year 1996, they will certainly result in less spending on
marine mammal behavior research. With the possibility of
such drastic budget cuts, it will be nearly impossible for the
Department of Commerce to determine that the proposed reg-
ulations are safe measures.
Finally, the regulations are vague and leave many key
terms undefined. Yet, the Department of Commerce expects
the average fisherman to determine what deterrent measures
are appropriate for use. If the proposed rules are imple-
mented, marine mammals will suffer injury and death at the
hands of both non-commercial fishermen and commercial
fishermen, who lack the proper guidance for deterring marine
mammals safely. Fishermen need unambiguous, defined reg-
ulations relating to general deterrence measures if the De-
partment of Commerce intends to prevent the high risk of
accidents that will occur without such guidance.
VI. Conclusion
Since its inception in 1972, the MMPA has made great
strides in increasing the populations of marine mammals. A
246. See NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE CouNcIL, THE YrAR OF LIVING DAN-
GEROUSLY: CONGRESS AND THE EqvmoNmrT nq 1995 11 (Dec. 1995).
247. See id
248. See id. Unsurprisingly, Congress' only environmentally-related pro-
posed budget increase that was equal to or higher than the President's was for
road building in National Forests, under the Department ofAgriculture. See id.
249. See id.
250. See NATuRAL REsoURCEs DEFENSE COUNCIL, Ti YEAR OF LrviNG DAN-
GEROUSLY: CONGRESS AND THE ENmmONAM.T IN 1995 11.
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recent study reported that the Pacific walrus population is at
or near historic high levels.251 Polar bear stocks are consid-
ered healthy and increasing.252 Additionally, the south-cen-
tral Alaska sea otter population is beginning to recover from
the Exxon Valdez oil spill.253 These statistics are examples of
the progress the MMPA has made in replenishing marine
mammal populations. However, the purposeful and acciden-
tal injuring and killing of marine mammals should be a con-
tinuing concern for the citizens, the marine scientists, the
judiciary, and the legislature of the United States.
Fishermen, whether commercial or private, have ravaged
the seas and destroyed numerous marine mammals. At
times, the destruction is the result of marine mammals
trapped in a fishing net. Other times, the destruction can be
attributed to careless actions or harassment by fishermen
and boaters. In any case, the overwhelming sentiment of
United States' citizens has been to increase protection for
pinnipeds and cetacaens, not to increase the risk of their de-
struction. By allowing fishermen to use general deterrence
measures, many of which are yet to be proven safe, the court,
the legislature, and the executive branch increase the deci-
mation of the marine mammal population that was just be-
251. See Concerning Reauthorization of the Marine Mammal Protection Act:
Congressional Testimony on Marine Mammal Protection Act Before the House
Subcomm. on Environment and Natural Resources of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 103d Cong. (1994) (statement of Mollie Beattie,
Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), available in 1994 WL 14168552 (page
numbers not available online).
The Pacific walrus, a population shared with Russia, had an esti-
mated minimum population of 201,000 in 1990 based on a joint
Russia/U.S. population survey. Although this estimate is less than
the estimate of 232,000 animals derived from the 1985 survey,
anomalous ice conditions prevailed during the 1990 survey and
comparing the two estimates is, at best, a tenuous proposition.
Id.
252. See id.
253. See id. Fortunately, the sea otters and other animal and plant life are
beginning to recover from the spill, even though Exxon's $2.5 billion clean-up
was considered to have done more harm than good. See Will Nixon, Off the
Critical List: Without Much Help From a $2.5 Billion Cleanup, Alaska's Prince
William Sound is Rapidly Recovering, E: THE E RomasmrrAL MAGAZnqE, Oct.
1995, at 19.
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ginning to reap the benefits of the MMPA. The extent to
which the ramifications of the recent alteration of the MMPA
will affect marine mammals is uncertain; however, the out-
look is not optimistic. Unfortunately for marine mammals,
when David Hayashi took aim at the four porpoises, he, in
actuality, took aim at all marine mammals.
37
